



# HardBlare: a Hardware-Assisted Approach for Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

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## Introduction

HardBlare proposes a software/hardware codesign methodology to ensure that security properties are preserved all along the execution of the system but also during files storage. The general context is to address **Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)** that generally consists in attaching marks (also known as tags) to denote the type of information that are saved or generated within the system.


Let's suppose that "print" function is public and the tag of a variable x is underlined variable x.

Example code	Tag initialization	Tag propagation	Tag check
p = 3;	<u>p</u> ← public		
s = 42;	<u>s</u> ← secret		
x = p + s;		<u>x</u> ← <u>p</u> + <u>s</u> = <u>s</u>	
print(x);			if ( <u>x</u> != public) raise interruption


## State of the art

		Advantages	Disadvantages
Hybrid	Software	Flexible security policies Multiple attacks detected	Overhead (from 300% to 3700%)
	Hardware	Low overhead (<10%) Invasive modifications	Fixed Security policies
	In-core DIFT	Low overhead (<10%) Few security policies	Invasive modifications
	Dedicated CPU for DIFT	Low overhead (<10%) Few modifications to CPU	Wasting resources Energy consumption (x 2)
	Dedicated DIFT Coprocessor	Flexible security policies Low overhead (<10%) CPU not modified	Communication between CPU and DIFT Coprocessor


## Static Analysis



- During the **compilation phase**, a **static analysis** is done on the **LLVM intermediate representation** produced from the source code, and propagated to the **ARM backend** for the machine code generation
- The **result of static analysis** gives a list of **dependencies** between information containers (e.g. registers, memory spaces...) for every **basic blocks** which are stored on a dedicated section in a **ELF File**
- During **run-time**, the **Program Trace Macrocell (PTM)** generates a **trace** containing the **address** for each committed instruction **modifying the PC value**
- Annotations** related to the **basic block** identified by its address, given by the trace, are **processed by the coprocessor** to propagate tags



## ARM Cortex-A9 Trace mode: Coresight components



### Definitions

- Tag dependencies** block contains annotations loaded when the program is launched
- Memory tags** block contains tags related to information containers
- Tag register file** contains tags related to CPU registers

### DIFT step-by-step

- ARM CoreSight Components export trace (for both CPUs) towards PL in **PFT (Program Flow Trace)** protocol
- PFT Decoder decodes trace in usable format
- Using decoded trace, DIFT Coprocessor reads tag dependencies block
- DIFT Coprocessor looks for the tags either in memory or tag register file
- DIFT Coprocessor computes tags depending on propagation rules
- DIFT Coprocessor updates corresponding tags
- DIFT Coprocessor checks for security policy violation and raise an interruption

## Some References

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## Main Contributions at a Glance

- Hardware-assisted DIFT system with limited time overheads.
- Approach based on a non-modified CPU with a standard Linux and generic binaries  $\Rightarrow$  Could be implemented by industrial partners in medium-term.
- Hardened with hardware security mechanisms: trusted coprocessor storage and bus protection in terms of confidentiality/integrity.
- Contributions on software-related issues as well (static/dynamic IFC analysis, i.e. hybrid analysis).
- Perspectives on runtime reconfiguration and multicore/manycore systems.